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Abstract 

By comparing and contrasting the underlying principles of the sustainable water management (SWM) in England and the developing countries, this paper highlights the features and limitations of current water practices in achieving long-term sustainability in England. The over-reliance on formal and judiciary institutions fails to acknowledge the complex roles of agency and socially-embedded institutions in shaping water-using norms and behaviour. The minimal level of community participation does not help in building trust amongst water users, regulators and suppliers. Decentralisation, in the form of privatisation, does not necessarily enhance water efficiency, and the universal application of water regulations may not fit into local conditions. 







Sustainable water – lessons from the developing world


‘…. a mixed group of stakeholders could agree on the desirability of ‘sustainable water management’, as an objective, but they meant different things by that term’ ​[1]​

1. Introduction

Sustainable water (and wastewater) management (SWM) has become a popular term in water management literature, but what it means is not clear. Publications on water management do not even offer a clear definition ​[2]​. This lack of clarity results in confusion and leaves stakeholders with different, and sometimes contradicting, understanding and interpretation. This paper seeks to find a consensus, not simply for the definition per se, but for a better understanding of the assumptions and the underlying implication of SWM. 

In most SWM literature, three key elements are commonly found: management, finance and governance. They are aimed at proper coordination and planning in order to ensure that water is available at the right time and in the right place, and simultaneously economic, ecological and social sustainability are achieved. In other words, SWM requires re-examination of ‘the roles played by the state and other public and private actors’ in water financing and governance ​[3]​. 

This paper was initiated by an interest in water management in the developing world context and draws upon the common-pool resources management literature which regards water as both an economic and a public good. As many developing countries have faced severe water scarcity problems, the pressure to develop a sustainable water management model has been imminent since the 1990s. Owing to the advocacy of large international development agencies, such as the World Bank, wide discussion has made the guiding principles of SWM in the developing world context explicit. Acknowledging the risk of over-simplification, understanding the developing world context, it is argued, provides an appropriate starting point to explore water management in England. 

The structure of the paper is as follows: it starts by examining SWM in the developing world and then compares and contrasts the guiding principles with the English context. The final section highlights the limitations associated with the neo-institutional approach to water management in England, including the minimal involvement of community and the over-reliance on formal institutions in shaping individuals’ water-use behaviour. 

2. SWM in the developing world 
2.1 Neo-institutional approach
Water supply has always been a top priority in the developing world. Most poor countries adopted the basic needs approach in the 1970s and 1980s. Infrastructure, such as dams and wells, were built to provide adequate clean drinking water to meet demands. These projects, however, frequently proved ineffective and unsustainable. The failure lies in the top-down, blue-print and technically-biased approach. The lack of continual financial and technical support after the projects were completed failed to maintain the water infrastructure. The real needs of poor local communities were not met owing to limited local capacity. Biases towards providing a water supply also put waste management at a low priority, and consequently, clean water was often contaminated by waste.  In addition, some water supplies were constantly disrupted by conflicts between upstream and downstream stakeholders and, on a macro-scale, between countries. 

Neo-institutional thinking has become influential in shaping SWM since the 1990s. Institutional scholars argue that water and waste water problems should not simply be narrowed down to (in)adequacy. Instead, the emphasis should be put on efficiency, ownership and sustainability and the focus should be shifted from state provision to private sector and community involvement ​[4]​. 

The failure of effort to provide sustainable water supplies, institutionalists claim, lies in inadequate incentives and weak regulatory and legal arrangements ​[5]​. The public goods nature of water provides a strong temptation for free-riding behaviour which results in low incentives in water efficiency. The solutions, they propose, are to restructure water-related institutions in order to get the incentives right, to redefine water as economic goods, and to change the role and perception of the public and private sectors in water industry. All these attempts are to align individuals’ private interests with collective outcomes. 

Theoretically, Mancur Olson ​[6]​ and Garett Hardin ​[7]​ are the key players in the first generation of concepts relevant to collective action. They offer a pessimistic view of collective action on the grounds that selfish and opportunistic individuals are necessarily tempted to free-ride. They argue that only strong state regulation or well-defined private property rights are the solution to collective action dilemmas. The second generation of collective action, however, is more optimistic about the prospects for collective action. It highlights the role of institutions in facilitating and constraining individual behaviour. The success of collective action, Ostrom and Sawyer ​[8]​ suggest, does not necessarily lie in material incentives or coercion, but in ‘right’ institutional arrangements. High levels of social capital and trust and close networks help to generate strong incentives and a sense of water ownership. They therefore advocate establishing water-users’ committees at village level, encouraging wider public participation in water management and including marginal groups in the decision-making processes. 


2.2 10 SWM principles

The extensive literature on water management shows ten fundamental principles for SWM. These principles, objectives and underlying assumptions are summarised in Table A. 

The key feature of SWM is the synergy of state, market and community. The combination of demand-driven and supply-driven water management is to address the past mistake of relying on one side or the other. In addition, the SWM principles are also aimed at meeting five dimensions of sustainability: 
	Cost-recovery, water pricing and clearly-defined property rights are intended to achieve economic sustainability and efficiency. 
	Pulling in the private sector and the involvement of community help to sustain financial sustainability and viability. 
	Technical sustainability is achieved by appropriate technology and good monitoring systems to reduce the chances of infrastructure breakdown. 
	Increasing the sense of water ownership and including marginal groups in water-use committees are an attempt to address social sustainability, equity and access. While strengthening the rule of law and regulations promotes good governance, decentralisation gives autonomy to local governments to deal with geographically-specific needs. 
	Environmental sustainability is expected to be achieved when water is used more efficiently and waste is minimised. Despite the recognition of multiple dimensions of sustainability, environmental concern is not placed high in the SWM principles in developing countries. This is because environmental sustainability, concerning inter-generational obligations, is not regarded as the first priority while the present generation is currently suffering from drought and poverty.  
 
2.3 The role of institutions in shaping water behaviour 
The SWM model highlights the role of institutions in shaping individuals’ water-use behaviour, distribution and access. As mentioned before, institutionalists argue that the failure of water resources management lies in inadequate institutions in water efficiency. Institutions, therefore, need to be designed to alter the incentive structure by increasing the opportunity cost of free-riding and formulating mutual expectations of cooperative behaviour. 

Institutions are generally regarded as ‘rules of the game’ which determine what behaviour is appropriate ​[9]​. There are three forms of institutions: judiciary, bureaucratic and socially-embedded. Judiciary institutions comprise the law and regulations which determine who have access to water and how much. Clear sets of rights and responsibilities are laid down, so that water users know what is expected of them. Sanctions, such as threatening to cut water supply, are used to deter free-riding behaviour and to ensure water efficiency. Bureaucratic institutions are water-use organisations and committees which make decisions about rules, access and distribution. In contrast, socially-embedded institutions are social values and norms which govern and shape water-use behaviour. These three forms of institutions, however, are not mutually exclusive. 

The institutional arrangements are not ‘once-and-for-all’ in nature, but are consistently reviewed for ongoing re-arrangement to ensure efficiency and sustainability. The ultimate aim of the arrangements is to form contractual relations between the community and individuals to secure a self-enforcing form of ownership and responsibility for their community resources ​[10]​. This approach moves away from mere provision of water facilities to long-term resource management.

Water partnership and trust-building between central and local governments, between private and public sectors, and between individuals, experts and government officials, become crucial in building the contractual relationships. These partnerships are essential as ‘a framework for dialogue through which all stakeholders can reach agreement that is acceptable to all members …. the stakeholder water committees in some African villages can be regarded as local water partnerships. Through their representatives on these committees, local people are able to articulate what they want and how they want it done’ ​[11]​. Generating social capital, in the form of close networks and a high level of trust, increases the ability of individuals to engage in collective action. 



3. SWM in England 
After reviewing a wide range of literature related to water planning in England, it is not difficult to pinpoint that the philosophy behind water resources management in England is highly akin to the neo-institutional model in the developing world. Seven out of ten principles (shown in Table A) have currently been applied in the water sector in England. They are: ‘user pays’ principle, private sector involvement, appropriate technology, clear property rights, clear rights and responsibilities of water service providers and water users, monitoring and decentralisation. These are set out in more detail in Table B. 


Monbiot ​[12]​ argues that the close parallel between the principles applied in England and in the developing world ought not to be a surprise. He argues that international development and aid agencies have exported this western, neo-institutional water resources planning model to the developing world by imposing conditionality of loans. This is especially the case for privatisation and user charging policies. However, what is equally important are the differences. The level of community participation, the position of environmental sustainability in SWM principles and the role of ‘customers’ mark the differences between England and the developing world. Questions as to why ‘customers’ are left out in the decision-making processes of water management need to be explained. The exclusion of the public poses challenges for EU Water Framework Directives and the Aarhus Convention ​[13]​. The Aarhus Convention suggests that sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement of all stakeholders. It stresses the need for citizen's participation in environmental issues. The following section highlights some of the similarities and differences. 

3.1 Similarities 
Both England and the developing countries have shown changing relationships between the private and public sector in water management over the past three decades. The history of water privatisation in England is rather short - the water industry was privatised in 1989 after regionalisation in 1974 and nationalisation in 1983 ​[14]​. It now consists of ten regional water and sewage companies and seventeen privately owned water supply companies. The increasing involvement of the private sector means the reduction of state subsidies, redefinition of property rights of water and reconstruction of water control, use and distribution. 

The government becomes the regulator, rather than the provider, of the water services. This gives a greater autonomy to the water utilities in delivering services. The Office of Water Services (Ofwat) is an economic regulator which promotes water efficiency and has the ability to cap water charges. The Environment Agency safeguards water quality and environmental performance of the privatised companies. This clear division of responsibilities and power amongst water companies, government and regulators is quite different from the general situation in the developing world where the private sector remains largely inactive.  

The water industry in England relies heavily on market-based instruments to provide incentives for water efficiency and disincentives to pollution activities. Water pricing, for instance, is intended to ‘better reflect the marginal costs of water use, and thus provide stronger incentives for efficient use’ ​[15]​. Cost recovery is aimed at recovering the full costs of water services provision and the external costs associated with water use and provide a profit-margin for shareholders. While sanctions are imposed on water companies which violate water regulations, financial allowances are provided to encourage more sustainable innovative practices. For example, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) initiated the Enhanced Capital Allowance Scheme in 2001 which allows business to claim 100% first year capital allowances on investments in technologies and products that encourage sustainable water use (Inland Revenue website). How successful this scheme, however, is yet known. 

3.2 Differences
Community participation is not new in England. Public consultation takes place from time to time, but the level of participation remains low. While water users in the developing countries are encouraged to participate in negotiating rules and roles, English customers, though not completely neglected, are largely left out of the decision-making processes. For example, When Thames Water decided to build a desalination plant to increase water supply to meet the increasing demand, there was little public consultation; it is not certain how much the public are consulted or even informed about this decision and the choice of technology​[16]​. How this minimal level of community participation influences sustainable development will be discussed later. 

It is not uncommon for water companies in the developing countries to threaten to cut water supplies if their customers do not pay the costs. The use of sanctions, however, is seldom enforced in England owing to huge social pressure from the public and the media related to humanitarian and public health issues. Indeed, recent legislation also makes the disconnections of water supply for non-payment of bills illegal ​[17]​. 

The objective of environmental sustainability is placed high in SWM in England. The principles of proximity and minimisation in waste management have also gained wider currency than in most developing countries. While poor countries struggle to provide clean water to meet increasing demands, England commands more resources to show its concern about inter-generational issues such as sustainability. 

4. Limitations of SWM in England
The SWM model in England attempts to ensure water efficiency and financing viability without compromising environmental sustainability. However, water resources management is not power-neutral. The heavy reliance on law and regulations disregards the role of socially-embedded institutions in shaping water-using behaviour. Strengthening the role of water users as ‘customers’ does not necessarily result in higher water efficiency. The severely limited community participation may have a negative impact on long-term water sustainability. The following section focuses on four aspects: institution, agency, power and community participation. 

4.1	Institutions create disincentives
OECD ​[18]​ suggests the development and application of a strong legal framework to ensure the sustainable use of water. This is based on an assumption that regulations, stressing obligation and coercion, give the right signal for individual water users to align their private interests with collective outcomes. Regulations also guide water service providers to provide an appropriate level of service with an acceptable performance at an acceptable cost to customers ​[19]​. Under an appropriate institutional framework, it is believed that the conflicts between environmentalism and entrepreneurialism are reconcilable. In its consultation paper, CAG consultants, for example, suggest that: ‘reforming the current regulatory regime could make it profitable for companies to provide better …… services with less fuel, thus decoupling wellbeing from environmental damage’ ​[20]​. 

Evidence, however, shows a rather different picture - regulations hinder, rather than enhance, the adoption and implementation of sustainable practices. Foxon et al. ​[21]​ point out that: ‘the imposition of institutional systems and regulatory targets will encourage the adoption of less sustainable technologies or solutions by the water industry’. In other words, the heavy reliance on laws and regulations in water industry merely encourages seeking ‘quick wins’ rather than long-term, strategic and more innovative sustainable initiatives. 

Disincentives arising from the regulatory framework, Willis et al. ​[22]​ explain, are due to the profit-driven nature of private water companies. As their main objective is to guarantee constant water supply to meet demand, they do not have a strong incentive to do more than meet current environmental regulations ​[23]​. 

In addition, standard regulations have difficulties in meeting inter-regional variations. Taking waste minimisation as an example, Phillips et al. ​[24]​ mention that: ‘although best value legislation is expected to make a marked contribution to the adoption of more sustainable waste management practices in the future; cognisance must be taken of the regional variation in MSW (municipal solid waste) minimisation programmes’. Owing to heterogeneity of circumstances in different regions, treatment of environmental issues should depend on local and regional environmental resources. 

4.1.1 Role of socially-embedded institutions 
As mentioned earlier, there are three forms of institutions: regulatory, bureaucratic and socially-embedded. In SWM, however, there is more emphasis on the first two forms, than on the third. Institutionalists tend to believe that formal institutions, such as laws, regulations and water organisations, are effective in ensuring efficient use of water. The neglect of informal institutions, however, has a negative impact on water sustainability. 

Informal or socially-embedded institutions are defined as social values, norms, habits and routines in guiding our everyday lives, including water consumption and perception of alternative water innovations. These institutions strongly influence water-using behaviour because water-related norms and practices ‘think on our behalf’ ​[25]​and they can both facilitate and constrain individuals in switching to more sustainable innovations. For example, to explain the failure of the riparian buffer zones in England, Ducros and Watson ​[26]​ interviewed the affected farmers about their goals, motives and values. Recognising the role of socially-embedded institutions explains why technically sound policies often result in very limited beneficial effects. 

In reality, however, when water regulations fail to achieve the expected objectives, instead of examining how the informal institutions affect individuals’ water-using behaviour, experts tend to blame the current price level of water for being too low ​[27]​. 

Highlighting the significance of social values and norms also challenges a myth that individuals are necessarily transformative agents who want to make changes to their lives. While the continuation of the ‘business as usual’ practice may contradict the principle of sustainability, informal institutions may constrain us in changing our habits or seeking alternative sustainable innovations. 

4.2	Over-simplification of the role of agency
Agency here is defined as an individual’s capacity to act. The tendency to reinforce the role of water users as ‘customers’ or ‘consumers’ is problematic since this has simplified the complexity of agency. Assigning clear rights and responsibilities to customers is considered as an act of empowerment which gives them a strong sense of ownership. Encouraging customer-orientation to develop financially viable water and sanitation services regards customers as rational individuals who make water-related decisions based on economic rationality. Cost-benefit analysis may attempt to establish links between the kind of service that benefits the stakeholders and what they are willing to contribute in cash ​[28]​. 

The customer-orientation, however, does not necessarily guarantee higher transparency or a louder voice to water-users in the process of decision-making. The regional privatisation of the water market in England means that water companies have a monopoly of water distribution and sewage disposal within their franchise areas. Customers cannot vote with their feet by switching to other water utilities, no matter how dissatisfied they feel about the quality of the water service they are receiving. 

In addition, the main concern of the water companies is to maintain financial returns and satisfy investors and shareholders. The needs of their customers are not in practice usually put in very high priority. Empowering customers to ensure higher water efficiency and sustainability, therefore, remains a myth because customers lack the real power to challenge the status quo. 

SWM also resonates with the rational choice theory, assuming that human beings are selfish and calculating, and thus they tend to cheat and abuse water. In order to avoid water wastage, heavy reliance on regulations and monitoring, such as metering, are favoured. Sanctions are considered necessary to punish non-compliance. In the principle of water charging, Figueres et al. ​[29]​ make this assumption explicit: ‘paying for water makes people more responsible for their demand, as they often ask for more than they really need’. The case of BedZED (a new housing development in the London Borough of Sutton), however, demonstrates that, even without coercion, tenants are willing to cooperate and rarely put sanitary towels, nappies or condoms down the toilets or drains ​[30]​. This example suggests that individuals can act altruistically and  cooperatively for sustainable development. 

4.3	The role of community participation in water sustainability 
Weak community participation in the water sector in England suggests that SWM remains a top-down approach. The restructuring process of water governance is a good example. While unelected bodies, such as private firms and their trade organisations, such as WaterUK, are invited to join the consultation meetings, Cashman et al. ​[31]​ highlight the problems that ‘horizontal networks of participating organisational associations sited outside of the democratic representation process’. The exclusion of the voice of community implies that real partnership remains the exception rather than the norm. 

The co-creation of knowledge is difficult to achieve when the government and water-related institutions fail to listen to the needs, desire and knowledge of local people. Bishop and Phillips ​[32]​ criticise planners for their narrow focus on internally derived priorities, targets and goals rather than on meeting the society’s broader needs and priority being articulated from the grassroots.  

The exclusion of community in the water sector contradicts to the ‘Third Way’ approach initiated by the British government. Since the Labour took the power in 1997, it has campaigned for social inclusion and community involvement. The ‘Third Way’ suggests that the sole reliance on the state, market or community fails to bring about the expected positive effects of the water reforms. Instead, the partnership or synergy of these three components is needed. This, however, may show the instrumental view of government towards public participation. Only when the involvement of communities can be proved to improve project efficiency does the government want to mobilise public action. 

The minimal level of community involvement, however, has a long-term negative impact on water sustainability. Drawing upon his experience in Scotland and Northern Ireland, Boak ​[33]​ argues that community participation results in better decision-making processes. In the context of an increasing lack of trust in experts and government officials, he argues, there is a need to pull in more support from community members. Blackstock and Richards ​[34]​ also suggests that informed and active citizenship is a pre-requisite for the effective governance of social and environmental systems. The co-construction of the resource management solutions helps the move towards a shared understanding of the problems and gradually changes the norms and perceptions of individuals towards sustainability. 

In other words, SWM tends to play down the dimension of ‘power’ – whose voice is recognised. In England, improving drinking water quality and efficiency of water use depends heavily on development in science and technology. It is not to deny the contribution of technical know-how towards sustainability, but the traditional ‘predict and provide approach’, devising engineering solutions to satisfying human needs, remains strong. The blue-print ideas about project planning and implementation still dominate the intervention and institutional reforms ​[35]​. This atmosphere creates an unfavourable condition for community participation since local knowledge is not valued highly. 

4.4	Paradoxes of decentralisation 
The policy of decentralisation in water management in England has taken the form of privatisation. The state’s retreat from direct service provision in 1989 marks the transfer of water ownership from the public to the private sector. Decentralisation is aimed at providing flexibility to allow the lowest administrative level to make their own decisions in meeting local needs, improving efficiency, enabling local governance and strengthening local capacity. Foxon et al. ​[36]​ believes that decentralisation necessarily goes hand in hand with water sustainability because it seeks ‘solutions as best framed at the local level’. Drawing upon his experience in Scotland, Boak ​[37]​ also claims that decentralisation provides ‘a sense of increased closeness to policy development following devolution’.

Despite the potential, decentralisation does not necessarily lead to higher economic efficiency ​[38]​. It may have a negative impact on sustainability. Taking the UK waste recycling programme as an example, the retreat of the role of central government means that the success of waste recycling lies in the initiatives of local authorities. In his research, Entwistle ​[39]​ discovers that local authorities have low incentives to carry out the projects. He contends that: ‘the absence of incentives to cooperation makes the realisation of local authority recycling a zero-sum game where any advances are achieved at someone else’s cost’. As a result, the principle of waste minimisation is left as a private business, subject to the conscience of domestic households and individual firms. Decentralisation does not automatically generate higher incentives. Neither should it give the central government an excuse to reduce subsidies. In the water context, local authorities need more, rather than less, support and resources from central government in promoting water sustainability. In current water governance structure in England, local authorities are left out of the decision making process in water management. The government should consider how voices of local authorities can be heard. A good example is demonstrated by the new government strategy for flood and coastal erosion risk management in which local authorities are encouraged to work closely with central government in addressing the issue ​[40]​. 

5. Conclusions 
It is not the intention of this paper to suggest that the ten principles of SWM, proposed by the neo-institutional school, are the golden rules, and that England’s inability to comply with all ten is problematic. Instead, by comparing and contrasting the SWM of England and developing countries, this makes the underlying assumptions and objectives of  SWM in England more explicit. 

The paper has shown that, in common with the developing world, the water sector in England has relied heavily on market-based instruments and regulations to provide incentives for water efficiency. The clearly-defined power and responsibilities of the government as regulator, water companies as water provider, and the public as customers, provide a clear framework of SWM. 

However, in the case of England, playing down the role of community and heavy reliance on formal institutions are detrimental to achieving long-term water sustainability. As effective environmental governance and sustainability requires active citizenship, the lack of community participation in water management and planning fails to co-construct a shared understanding of the problems and solutions. The general assumption that ‘customers’ are economic animals, who respond to the external water-pricing level and regulations, widens the gap of knowledge between the perceived and actual water-use behaviour in our everyday practices. 

Despite the potential of community participation in sustainability, however, the public should not be considered as a ‘cheap’ solution to water problems. Before more public involvement can be activated in the decision-making process, there is a need to find out what causes the current low level of participation. Is it a result of the ‘market-led’ approach which is so efficient that community members do not feel the need to participate? Or, is it because the media have played a leading role in scrutinising water regulators and water companies? While community participation is strongly advocated in the developing world, it may simply reflect weak state and inactive private sector involvement in water allocation, so that there is a need to draw resources from already-poor communities as an alternative support. 

Neglecting the role of informal institutions, such as social norms and values of water-related behaviour, generates, rather than addresses, conflicts between supply-led and demand-led water management. In order to comply with the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive ​[41]​, for instance, the British government had no choice, but expanded waste treatment infrastructure to deal with increasing urban wastewater. This contradicts the minimisation principle of waste management. From this example, it reminds us that supply-led water management remains strong in water planning and is still firmly embraced by the influential development agencies, such as the EU. 

Lastly, SWM cannot be separated from other sectors, such as land, transport and irrigation. While the developing countries struggle to have better integration of water management into sectoral and landuse policies, water management in England remains outside the direct control of the regional planning processes ​[42]​. Appropriate water management policies, as Green ​[43]​ suggests, require a sense of integration, which runs across the three key dimensions: of the catchment, land and water management, and across different uses of water.



Table A: 10 SWM principles and objectives

Key principles	Assumptions and objectives
1/ ‘User pays’ principle	Water as economic goodsEconomic sustainability (achieve efficiency by empowering water-users)Water as public goodsEcological sustainability(creating less waste to reduce negative externalities)
2/ Appropriate technology 	Supply-side management (to guarantee adequate / constant supply of water) More environmentally-friendly devices (ecological sustainability)
3/ Establish clear boundary 	Clearly-defined property rights (economic & ecological sustainability) 
4/ Key stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making processes in formal institutions (e.g. water-user committees)	Respecting indigenous knowledge (they know best!)Negotiating appropriate water-related rules and roles to increase legitimacy Including marginal voices (social equity)
5/ Clear sets of rules and roles 	Providing high incentives to reduce free-riding behaviour Negotiating access to water
6/ Monitoring	Technical sustainability Creating incentive for water efficiency Social equity 
7/ Sanctions	Creating incentives by punishing non-compliance 
8/ Conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g. arbitration body)	Resolving conflicts by negotiation and regulations 
9/ Community participation in collective choices	Acknowledging indigenous knowledge Enhancing project sustainability by a high sense of ownership Providing alternative cash and manpower support 
10/ Decentralisation (autonomy at local level) & rules governing nested relationships with central govt 	Recognising power dimensions Acknowledging local conditions Reducing bureaucracy  
(Author’s original table, some ideas from works by Ostrom and Saywer (2003) and Uphoff (2000)





Table B: A checklist of SWM principles and their application in England 

SWM principles	SWM in England
1/ User pays principle	Yes
2/ Appropriate technology 	Yes
3/ Establish clear boundary 	Yes (in term of clearly-defined property rights)
4/ Key stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making processes in formal institutions (e.g. water-user committees)	No (although consultation takes place from time to time, water-users are largely left out in the decision-making processes)
5/ Clear sets of rules and roles 	Yes (rights and responsibilities of customers and water service providers are clearly laid down)
6/ Monitoring	Yes (e.g. metering, leakage management)
7/ Sanctions	Yes (Environment Agency and Ofwat penalise water companies if they violate regulations)No (recent legislation has made disconnections of water supply for non-payment of bills illegal) 
8/ Conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g. arbitration body)	Yes 
9/ Community participation in collective choices	No (community participation is very minimal, community members are not encouraged to get involved in decision-making processes) 
10/ Decentralisation  	Yes (decentralisation, in the form of privatisation, marks the change of water ownership from the state to private)

(Author’s original table)





References 


















PAGE  



2



^1	  Shackley S and Deanwood R. Stakeholder perceptions of climate change impacts at the regional scale: implications for the effectiveness of regional and local responses. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (3), 381-402, p390. 
^2	   OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) The OECD environmental strategy: progress in managing water resources, 2004. (see www.oecd.org/env) for details. 
^3	  Figueres C, Tortajada C and Rockstrom J. (EDS) Rethinking water management: innovative approach to contemporary issues. Earthscan, London, 2003, pviii. 
^4	  Uphoff N. Understanding social capital: learning from the analysis and experience of participation. Mansholt Graduate School Seminar (2000). (see www.sls.wau.nl/mi/Activities/Papers/default.htm for details). 
^5	  Ostrom E and Sawyer A. Polycentric organisation: a fundamental requisite for solving urban problems. Paper represented in Conference Urban development for economic growth and poverty reduction, Washington D. C, World Bank, Dec 15-17, 2003.
^6	  Olson M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965.
^7	  Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 1968, 162, 1243-1248.
^8	  Ostrom E and Sawyer A. Polycentric organisation: a fundamental requisite for solving urban problems. Paper represented in Conference Urban development for economic growth and poverty reduction, Washington D. C, World Bank, Dec 15-17, 2003.
^9	  North D. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
^10	  Mansuri G and Rao V. (EDS) Evaluating community driven development: a review of the evidence. Development Research Group, The World Bank, first draft, Feb, 2003. 
^11	  Figueres C. Let’s pump money in the water sector!. in Figueres C, Tortajada C and Rockstrom J. (EDS) Rethinking water management: innovative approach to contemporary issues. Earthscan, London, 2003, ch.11, p.220.
^12	  Monbiot G. Why is Britain using aid money to persuade South Africa to privatise its public services?. Guardian, 20 Oct, 2004.
^13	  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1998) (see www. unece.org/env/pp/ for details). 
^14	  Hall D. Consumer representation in the regulation of utilities in the UK. Flux, 2002, 48-49, Apr-Sept, 47-61.
^15	  OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) The OECD environmental strategy: progress in managing water resources, 2004, p.4. 
^16	  Spillett P. Water resources and limitations. Presented in Conference ‘Planning for water: a major challenge for the government’s new sustainable communities’, London, 21st Oct, 2004.
^17	  OFWAT (The Office of Water Services) Directive sent by Director of OFWAT to all water companies, RD 07/01, 2001.
^18	  OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) The OECD environmental strategy: progress in managing water resources. 
^19	  Entwistle T. Towards sustainable waste management: central steering, local enabling or autopoiesis?. Policy and Politics, 1999, 27 (3), 375-338, p384.
^20	  CAG Consultants. Report to the sustainable development commission: ‘State of sustainable development in the UK: Central / local govt focus, draft, 2000, para8.8. 
^21	  Foxon T J, McIlkenny G, Gilmour D, Oltean-Dumbrava C, Souter N, Ashley R, Butler D, Pearson P, Jowitt P and Moir J. Sustainability criteria for decision support in the UK water industry. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (2), 285-301, p444. 
^22	  Willis G, McMahon L, Garrod D and Powe A. Water companies’ service performance and environmental trade-offs. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (3), 363-379. 
^23	  Cashman A, Birkin F and Lewis L. Topping up or watering down? Sustainable development in the privatised UK water industry. Paper presented at the 9th Annual International Sustainable Development Research Conference, Nottingham, UK, March, 2003.
^24	  Phillips P, Adams K, Read A and Green A. Regional variations in waste minimisation in England: challenges and issues for policy development. Policy Review Section, 2000, 297-302, p302. 
^25	  Douglas M. How institutions think. Routledge, London, 1987.
^26	  Ducros C and Watson N. Integrated land and water management in the United Kingdom: narrowing the implementation gap. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (3), 304-423. 
^27	  Observations in EPSRC-sponsored WaND project (Water Cycle Management for New Development) meetings, 07/07/04 & 21/10/04 (see www. WaND.uk.net). 
^28	  Mulenga M. Impediments to the implementation of demand responsive methodology in urban sanitation programmes in Zambia and South Africa. Paper presented in The Alternative Water Forum, Bradford, 1-2 May, 2003, p.1. 
^29	   Figueres C. Let’s pump money in the water sector!. in Figueres C, Tortajada C and Rockstrom J. (EDS) Rethinking water management: innovative approach to contemporary issues. Earthscan, London, 2003, ch.11, 199-226, p.202, my emphasis. 
^30	  Shirley-Smith C. Setting up water management for BedZED. Paper presented in Conference ‘Planning for water: a major challenge for the government’s new sustainable communities. London, 21 Oct, 2004.
^31	  Cashman A, Birkin F and Lewis L. Topping up or watering down? Sustainable development in the privatised UK water industry. Paper presented at the 9th Annual International Sustainable Development Research Conference, Nottingham, UK, March,  2003, p10. 
^32	  Bishop K and Phillip A. Countryside planning: new approaches to management and conservation, Earthscan, London, 2004. 
^33	  Boak R, Carlyle H and Ioris A. Development of a high-level: technical process and detailed participation strategy to support the implementation of water resources management strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Paper presented at ICID (International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage) Seminar ‘Tools for public participation, conflict resolution and decision-making in water resources management, London, 2004, Oct 14.
^34	  Blackstock K and Richards C. Experiences from the field: lessons to learn from the Spey catchment management planning process. Paper presented at ICID (International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage) Seminar ‘Tools for public participation, conflict resolution and decision-making in water resources management, London, 2004, Oct 14. 
^35	  Willis G, McMahon L, Garrod D and Powe A. Water companies’ service performance and environmental trade-offs. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (3), 363-379, p363. 
^36	  Foxon T J, McIlkenny G, Gilmour D, Oltean-Dumbrava C, Souter N, Ashley R, Butler D, Pearson P, Jowitt P and Moir J. Sustainability criteria for decision support in the UK water industry. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2002, 45 (2), 285-301.
^37	  Boak R, Carlyle H and Ioris A. Development of a high-level: technical process and detailed participation strategy to support the implementation of water resources management strategies in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Paper presented at ICID (International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage) Seminar ‘Tools for public participation, conflict resolution and decision-making in water resources management, London, 2004, Oct 14, p24.
^38	  Saal D and Parker D. The impact of privatisation and regulation on the water and sewerage in England and Wales: a translog cost function model. Managerial and decision economics, 2000, 21, 253-268. 
^39	  Entwistle T. Towards sustainable waste management: central steering, local enabling or autopoiesis?. Policy and Politics, 1999, 27 (3), 375-38, p379.
^40	  Defra. Making Space for Water: Taking forward a new Government strategy for flood & coastal erosion risk management. 2005. 
^41	  EU (2000) Urban waste water treatment in the EU: State of the implementation of Directive 91/271/EEC (see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/waste/sludge/presentations/02_bloch.pdf) 
^42	  Counsell D and Bruff G. Treatment of the environment in regional planning: a stronger line for sustainable development?. Regional Studies, 2001, 35 (5), 284-490.
^43	  Green C. Flood management from the perspective of integrated water resource management. Paper given at the 2nd International Symposium on Flood Defence, Beijing, 2002.
